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GONZALES V. OREGON AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED 
SUICIDE: ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES 
Ken Levy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1990, the United States Supreme Court has issued three major decisions on 
euthanasia:1 Crozan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,2 Vacca v. Quil/,3 and 
Washington v. Glucksberg.4 Last term, the Court issued a decision, Gonzales v. 
Oregon,5 that discussed euthanasia but turned almost entirely on other issues, primarily 
statutory interpretation and the legitimate scope of the United States Attorney General's 
authority over medical policy among the fifty States. So Gonzales did not really advance 
the euthanasia debate very far. Still, the debate that it did provoke is interesting and 
worth further investigation, less for constitutional reasons and more for ethical and 
public policy reasons. 
The incidental debate focused on whether or not physician-assisted suicide-i.e., 
"a physician('s] facilitat[ing] a patient's death by providing the necessary means and/or 
information to enable the patient to perform the life-ending act"6 -serves a "legitimate 
medical purpose."7 While the majority held that it does serve a legitimate medical 
* J.D., Columbia University Law School; Ph.D., Philosophy, Rutgers University; B.A., Philosophy, 
Williams College. Member, New York State Bar. Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law 
School. Former Visiting Teaching Fellow, Columbia University Law School. I would like to thank Russell 
Christopher, I. Glenn Cohen, Dr. Lenore Day, Dr. Stuart Levy, and Jed Shugerman for helpful discussions 
about physician-assisted suicide; Dr. Robert Cassidy and Dr. Gulay Sezgin for lending me an impressive 
collection of literature on physician-assisted suicide; and the editors at the Tulsa Law Review for their 
excellent revisions and recommendations. 
I. Euthanasia is "commonly defined as the act of bringing about the death of a hopelessly ill and suffering 
person in a relatively quick and painless way for reasons of mercy." Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, 
American Medical Association (AMA), Decisions near the End of Life, 267 J. Am. Med. Assn. 2229, 2229 
(1992). 
2. 497 u.s. 261 (1990). 
3. 521 u.s. 793 (1997). 
4. 521 u.s. 702 (1997). 
5. 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006). 
6. Physician-Assisted Suicide, AMA Code of Ethics § E-2.211, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/ 
category/print/8459.html (last updated Aug. 22, 2005); Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. I, at 2229. 
7. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 915 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2000) and 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 
(2005)). See also Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin, Introduction: A Medical, Ethical, Legal, and 
Psychosocial Perspective, in The Case against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care (Kathleen 
Foley and Herbert Hendin eds., Johns Hopkins U. Press 2002) ("In physician-assisted suicide, the patient self­
administers the lethal dose that has been prescribed by a physician who knows the patient intends to use it to 
end his or her life.") 
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purpose, Justices Scalia, Roberts, and Thomas took the opposite position in their dissent. 
tJnf:tlli\l flntely, the majority did not indicate what this legitimate purpose is. So we are 
ttil left to fill in this blank ourselves. This article offers the most obvious way to fill in 
th s blank-namely, alleviation of suffering. 
This article will then survey-and reject-some ethical arguments against 
physician-assisted suicide. But the ultimate conclusion of this article is not that 
physician-assisted suicide should be legalized. Rather, the ultimate conclusion of this 
ltrticle is that States should think very long and hard before they follow Oregon's 
example and legalize physician-assisted suicide within their own borders. For even if 
there are no decisive ethical objections against physician-assisted suicide, it does raise 
serious policy worries. Perhaps the most important among them is that the very 
legalization of physician-assisted suicide would likely pressure too many terminally ill 
patients into exercising this option unnecessarily early and for the wrong reasons-not to 
alleviate their own suffering but to minimize the burden, inconvenience, and economic 
expense that they fear their continued existence would impose on others.8 
II. THE ROAD TO GONZALES V. OREGON 
The debate about whether or not physician-assisted suicide serves a legitimate 
medical purpose has hardly arisen in a vacuum. Rather, it has arisen directly out of the 
decisions issued in-and questions unresolved by-three previous cases dealing with the 
"right to die": Cruzan, Vacco, and G/ucksberg. This part summarizes the issues and 
arguments in these decisions, including the concurring and dissenting opinions, that are 
related closely enough to physician-assisted suicide. 
A. Cruzan 
1. The Majority 
In Cruzan, the majority interpreted the central question to be whether or not Nancy 
Cruzan, who had been in an automobile accident that left her in a permanent vegetative 
state, had a constitutional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. 
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that she did. According to 
Rehnquist, Cruzan had a "constitutionally protected liberty interest" in refusing 
unwanted medical treatment, a liberty interest that derives from the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause.9 
This conclusion, however, raised a problem. Because Cruzan was in a vegetative 
state, it was impossible to ask her directly whether or not she wished to remain on life 
support. So her desires had to be ascertained in some other, less direct, way-namely, 
from evidence proffered by her family, friends, and guardian ad litem. Chief Justice 
8. This article will discuss but not evaluate arguments for and against our having a constitutional right to 
physician-assisted suicide. For an eloquent defense of the proposition that a constitutional right to physician­
assisted suicide should be recognized, see John Rawls et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers· Brief, 44 N.Y. 
Rev. Bks. 41 (Mar. 27, 1997). 
9. 497 U.S. at 278. The Due Process Clause provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § I. 
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Rehnquist argued that, in order to remove Cruzan's life support, this evidence had to 
establish to a "clear and convincing" degree that she wanted, or would have chosen in a 
conscious and competent state, to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. For only this high 
standard would lead to the correct distribution of the risk of error. On the one hand, if 
Cruzan's life support were removed against her wishes, then her right of self­
determination would be irreversibly violated; once she was dead, there would be no 
bringing her back. If, on the other hand, Cruzan's life support continued against her 
wishes, then, while her right of self-determination would be violated, this violation 
would still be reversible. The possibility would remain that clear and convincing 
evidence that Cruzan (would have) wished to die would arrive. And if it did, the hospital 
could at that time fulfill Cruzan's wishes and remove her life support.10 
2. Justice Scalia's Concurrence 
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia pointed out that the petitioners, Cruzan's parents, 
had a difficult obstacle to overcome. States may clearly pass laws prohibiting suicide 
without violating the Due Process Clause. Yet the petitioners were trying to demonstrate 
that States like Missouri were violating the Due Process Clause by forbidding Cruzan's 
parents from withdrawing her life support. So petitioners had to demonstrate that there is 
a distinction between suicide and refusal of lifesaving medical treatment and that this 
distinction is constitutionally relevant. Accordingly, petitioners attempted to draw three 
distinctions that satisfied both of these criteria. The second of these distinctions, which 
only Justice Scalia discussed, was that refusal "would bring on [Cruzan's] death not by 
any affirmative act but by merely declining treatment that provides nourishment."11 
"Suicide, it is said, consists of an affirmative act to end one's life; refusing treatment is 
not an affirmative act 'causing' death, but merely a passive acceptance of the natural 
process of dying."12 
Justice Scalia correctly identified this distinction as a species of the more general 
distinction between "action and inaction," which is more commonly known in 
philosophy, criminal law, and tort law as the distinction between positive action and 
omission. Justice Scalia then argued that this distinction between positive action and 
omission is morally-and therefore constitutionally-irrelevant. For, all else being 
equal, action and omission are both intention- and outcome-equivalent. They are merely 
different means to the same deliberately-sought end. For example, a parent is equally 
guilty of homicide whether she actively poisons her child or deliberately allows her child 
starve to death. It does not matter that the parent performs a positive action in one 
situation (administering poison) and performs no positive action in the other (stands idly 
by). Either way, the parent equally intends the child's death and the child equally dies.13 
Rather than dismissing the positive action-omission distinction entirely, Justice 
10. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283. 
11. !d. at 295. The two other distinctions were that Cruzan was "permanently incapacitated and in pain" 
and that "preventing her from effectuating her presumed wish to die requires violation of her bodily integrity." 
/d. 
12. !d. at 296. 
13. !d. at 296-97 
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Scalia made two positive suggestions. First, he suggested that the positive action­
omission distinction was not entirely irrelevant, that it "has some bearing upon the 
legislative judgment of what ought to be prevented as suicide" and could be "discerned 
by logic or legal analysis."14 Second, Justice Scalia suggested that the positive action­
omission distinction was not far away from the more appropriate distinction. According 
to Justice Scalia, the line should be drawn not between positive action and omission but 
rather between "various forms" of omission-namely, omisstons "that consist of 
abstaining from 'ordinary' care and [omissions] that consist of abstaining from 
'excessive' or 'heroic' measures."15 
Curiously, however, Scalia's second suggestion ended there. He did not explain 
why this distinction between omission of ordinary measures and omission of heroic 
measures is important or relevant. So it is difficult to see exactly what point Justice 
Scalia was making. Was he suggesting that withdrawal of life support is constitutionally 
protected when, and only when, it involves the omission of heroic measures? Was he 
suggesting that the distinction between omission of ordinary measures and omission of 
heroic measures is morally relevant but still constitutionally irrelevant? Or something 
else altogether? It is not clear. 16 
3. Justice Stevens' Dissent 
Two different dissenting opinions were offered, one by Justice Stevens17 and the 
other by Justice Brennan.18 Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justices Marshall 
and Blackmun. 
Justice Stevens argued that the majority should have assigned greater weight to 
Cruzan's own best interests than to the State's interest in preserving and protecting life.19 
The main challenge for Justice Stevens was to demonstrate that withdrawal of life 
support was indeed in Cruzan's best interests in the first place. He could not simply 
assume this point because it would beg the question against those who believe that life is 
always preferable to death and therefore that it is always in a person's best interests to 
remain alive as long as possible, even if her life is impoverished to the level of a 
persistent vegetative state, than to die. Justice Stevens challenged this position with two 
arguments. 
First, Justice Stevens argued that whether or not a person has an interest in 
14. /d. at 296. 
15. Jd. 
16. The distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" treatments is sometimes thought to align with 
the distinction between treatment that ethically must be provided and treatment that morally may be withheld 
or withdrawn. See Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. 1, at 2230. But there are two problems with this 
position. First, the line between ordinary and extraordinary is difficult to draw. /d. at 2230-31. Second, the 
ordinary-extraordinary distinction seems to be non-moral; the determination of whether or not a given 
treatment is morally obligatory should be determined by moral, not (solely) non-moral, considerations. /d. 
17. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 330-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
18. Jd. at 301-30 (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). 
19. See also Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual 
Freedom 12-13 (Alfred A. Knopf 1993) (distinguishing between the "detached" claim that a person's life 
should be preserved because human life is sacred and the "derivative" claim that a person's life should be 
preserved because she has a right to continue, and interest in continuing, to live). 
2007] GONZALES V. OREGON AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 703 
remaining alive depends on whether or not her life has value for her. And, life abstracted 
from the person has no value for her. Rather, a person's life has value for her only if it 
reaches, or has the potential to reach, a certain minimal degree of quality-namely, 
consciousness without inordinate suffering. So if a given person's life does not and 
cannot reach this level, such as in Cruzan's  case, it does not have sufficient value for that 
person and that person therefore does not have an interest in remaining alive?0 
Second, Justice Stevens offered a two-part argument. First, even if Cruzan did 
have an interest in remaining alive, she had other interests that outweighed her interest in 
remaining alive. These other interests included how she would be remembered by "those 
whose opinions mattered to her," how she would want to be remembered, the integrity of 
her body, her dignity, and her personhood. Second, these other interests-which took 
precedence over Cruzan's  purported interest in staying alive-were better served by 
withdrawal, rather than continuation, of life support. 2 1  
Justice Stevens' dissent focused on Cruzan's best interests, which are independent 
of her (prior) desires. And independence entails potential conflict. We often do not want 
what is in our best interests. For example, it is in a child's best interests to get certain 
vaccinations even if she would prefer not to be pricked with a needle. One problem with 
Justice Stevens' position is that he did not explore this possible difficulty. Justice 
Stevens' position arguably commits him to the position that a persistent vegetative 
patient's best interests trump her (prior-expressed) wishes, whatever they might be. So 
even if a patient in a persistent vegetative state previously expressed a desire to stay 
indefinitely on life support, Justice Stevens' position arguably entails that this desire is 
not dispositive, that the patient should still be terminated if it would better serve the 
memories of those close to her, the integrity of her body, her dignity, and her 
personhood. This conclusion seems a bit harsh and counterintuitive, no less inconsistent 
with the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 22 
4. Justice Brennan's Dissent 
Perhaps aware of this weakness in Justice Stevens' advocacy of a best-interests 
standard, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that the standard should instead be 
Cruzan's autonomy, her self-determination, what she wanted or would have wanted in 
her current situation. He agreed with the majority that people like Cruzan have a 
constitutional "right to be free of unwanted artificial nutrition and hydration."23 
Still, Justice Brennan diverged from the majority on five main issues. First, he felt 
20. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 344-47, 356-57. 
2 1 .  /d. at 344, 350-51, 355-56. 
22. Of course, the potential conflict between autonomy and best interests may work in the opposite 
direction as well. It may be the case that the patient wishes to die, and this wish conflicts with her best 
interests. (Indeed, it is fear of this particular situation that motivates much, if not most, opposition to legalizing 
physician-assisted suicide.) Lois Shepherd makes a similar point about the potential conflict between 
autonomy and dignity. See Lois Shepherd, Dignity and Autonomy after Washington v. Glucksberg: An Essay 
about Abortion, Death, and Crime, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Policy 431, 453-55 (1998). 
23. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 302. We have now come across three different considerations that are used in 
determining whether or not withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment is constitutionally protected: the 
patient's autonomy, the patient's best interests, and the intrinsic value or sanctity of the patient's life. See 
Dworkin, supra n. 19, at 26, 190-98. 
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that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment was not merely an important "liberty 
interest" but fundamental. 24 Second, he argued that Missouri's interest in preserving life 
was not sufficiently important--at least not as important as Cruzan's contrary wish to 
discontinue life support.25 Third, Justice Brennan argued that, contrary to both the 
Missouri Supreme Court and the majority, the evidence that Cruzan wanted withdrawal 
of life support was clear and convincing .26 Fourth, he argued that not only a decision to 
discontinue unwanted life support but also a decision to continue life support inflicted 
irreversible damage.2 7  Fifth, he argued that if there is not clear and convincing evidence 
regarding what the patient wanted, the decision regarding what to do with the patient 
should not automatically "escheat" to the State but should instead be directed to "the 
person whom the patient himself would most likely have chosen as proxy or . . .  the 
patient's family."28 
B. Vacco 
In Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that even non-terminally ill patients 
have the constitutional right to refuse non-lifesaving medical treatment because forced 
medical treatment, even though non-lifesaving, would violate their "liberty interest in 
refusing unwanted medical treatment" just as much as forced lifesaving medical 
treatment.29 It goes without saying that there is an important distinction between the 
right to withdraw non-lifesaving medical treatment and physician-assisted suicide: only 
the latter will lead to death. So it would not be very convincing for proponents of 
physician-assisted suicide to argue that people have a constitutionally protected right to 
physician-assisted suicide because (a) withdrawal of any medical treatment is 
constitutionally protected and (b) there is no principled distinction between physician­
assisted suicide and the withdrawal of any medical treatment. Rather, if this argument is 
to have any possibility of success, (a) and (b) should be restricted to lifesaving medical 
treatment. 30 
In Vacco, it was precisely (b) that was at issue. The central question was whether 
or not there is a meaningful distinction between physician-assisted suicide and 
withdrawal of unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.31 (As discussed above, in his 
Cruzan concurrence, Justice Scalia had the foresight to confront this same issue.) 
Respondents offered the following argument for striking down New York State's 
ban on physician-assisted suicide: (a) all else being equal, there is no meaningful 
difference between physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of unwanted lifesaving 
24. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 304 -05. 
25. Jd. at 312-14. 
26. ld. at 319, 321- 25. 
2 7. I d. at 320 -2 1; see also Dworkin, supra n. 19, at 196 -98; Rawls et al., supra n. 8, at 46 . 
28. Cruzan, 497 U.S. a t  328 (footnote omitted). 
29. Jd. at 2 77-79 . 
30. See David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 335 New Eng. J. Med. 663, 665 
( 1996 ) (noting irony of notion that while a young person depressed from the breakup of a romantic relationship 
has the constitutional right to withdrawal of ventilator treatment for her asthma, a very elderly terminally ill 
person in great pain does not have the constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide). 
3 1. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 793 (1997). 
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medical treatment; (b) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires States to treat like cases alike;32 therefore, (c) physician-assisted suicide should 
receive the same constitutional protection that withdrawal of lifesaving medical 
treatment received in Cruzan. But the Court disagreed. Contrary to (a), Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's majority opinion held that there are meaningful differences between 
physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of unwanted lifesaving medical treatment, 
differences that are both "widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession and 
in our legal traditions" and "important and logical . . . certainly rationa1 ."33 
The first such distinction lies in intent. In both cases, the doctor expects or 
foresees that the patient will die sooner than she otherwise would. But in only one of 
these situations-physician-assisted suicide-is this result actually intended. The doctor 
does not intend this result if she merely withdraws life support. Instead, she intends 
"only" to respect her patient's wishes and thereby enable the patient to maintain her 
autonomy and dignity. 34 Chief Justice Rehnquist added that what applies to withdrawal 
of life support also applies to "aggressive palliative care." 35 Like the former, the latter 
may hasten the patient's death-i.e., may lead the patient to die earlier than she would 
have without the palliative medication36 -"but the physician's purpose and intent is, or 
may be, only to ease his patient's pain."37 Rehnquist's theory here is commonly known 
as the "Doctrine of Double Effect." The Doctrine of Double Effect holds that actions 
producing certain negative outcomes are morally permissible, even if these outcomes 
were reasonably foreseeable, as long as the outcomes were unintended. 38 
The second distinction lies in causation. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that how 
the doctor helps her patient to die determines the actual cause of the patient's death. On 
the one hand, if the doctor helps her patient to commit suicide by prescribing a lethal 
medication, then the cause of the patient's death is the medication. On the other hand, if 
the doctor withdraws life support, then the cause of the patient's death is the "underlying 
fatal disease or pathology." 39 So the patient's death can be directly attributed to the 
doctor only in the case of physician-assisted suicide, not in the case of withdrawal of life 
support.40 
In his discussion of the second distinction-causation-Chief Justice Rehnquist 
32. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV,§ I. 
33. Vacca, 521 U.S� at 800-01 (footnote omitted). 
34. !d. at 801-03. 
35. !d. at 802. 
36. See Leon R. Kass, 'I will Give No Deadly Dntg ': Why Doctors Must Not Kill, in Foley & Hendin, supra 
n. 7, at 34, 37; Thomas J. Marzen, "Out, Out Brief Candle": Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the 
Terminally Ill, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 7 99, 819 nn. 61, 62 (1994) ; Student Author, Physician-Assisted 
Suicide, Ill Harv. L. Rev. 237, 247 (1997); Shepherd, supra n. 22, at 465 n. 157. 
37 . Vacca, 521 U.S. at 802. 
38. See Kass, supra n. 36, at 36-37 ;  Yale Kamisar, The Rise and Fall of the 'Right' to Assisted Suicide, in 
Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7, at 81-82. But see Joan C. Callahan, Acts, Omissions, and Euthanasia, 2 Pub. 
Affairs Q. 21 (1988) (arguing that the Doctrine of Double Effect is conceptually and morally problematic). 
39. Vacca, 521 U.S. at 801. 
40. See also Paul Ramsey, The Patient as Person: Explorations in Medical Ethics ! 51 (Yale U. Press 1970) 
("In omission no human agent causes the patient's death, directly or indirectly. He dies his own death from 
causes that it is no longer merciful or reasonable to fight by means of possible medical interventions."). 
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actually offered a third distinction: the consequences of prohibition. He argued that the 
Cruzan Court determined that patients have a constitutional right to refuse lifesaving 
medical treatment on the basis of "well-established, traditional rights to bodily integrity 
and freedom from unwanted touching.',41 A State that prohibited withdrawal of life 
support would effectively be forcing some patients to undergo unwanted lifesaving 
medical treatment, which is a form of battery. Rehnquist then implied that the same 
cannot be said of physician-assisted suicide. Presumably what he had in mind was that 
States' prohibiting doctors from prescribing lethal medication does not force patients to 
suffer any violations to their "bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching." It 
does not force patients to do anything. Instead, it exerts force only upon doctors.42 
C. Glucksberg 
Vacca was the companion case to Glucksberg. Again, the Vacca Court held that 
New York State's prohibition against physician-assisted suicide did not violate 
terminally ill patients' Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights.43 In Glucksberg, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the State of Washington's prohibition against 
physician-assisted suicide did not violate terminally ill patients' Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process rights. 
1. The Majority 
Importantly, Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision was not that physician-assisted 
suicide violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and therefore must be 
prohibited. It was only that physician-assisted suicide is not protected by the Due 
Process Clause and therefore may be prohibited. Naturally, this proposition is consistent 
with a State's decision to permit physician-assisted suicide. As Chief Justice Rehnquist 
concluded, "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound 
debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our 
holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.'
,44 
Chief Justice Rehnquist offered several arguments for the majority's conclusion 
that physician-assisted suicide is not protected by the Due Process Clause. First, he 
argued that while Cruzan held that patients have a constitutional right to refuse unwanted 
lifesaving medical treatment, this right does not entail or encompass a further right to 
receive assistance from a doctor in terminating their lives. As he did in Vacca, 
Rehnquist argued that, despite their superficial resemblance, the two practices are 
substantively distinct enough to warrant different legal treatment.45 
Second, Rehnquist argued that if people do not have a right to perform a certain 
41. Vacco, 521 U. S. at 807 (citing Cntzan, 497 U. S. at 278-79,287-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
42. See also New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death Is Sought: Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia in the Medical Context 105, I 13 (2d. ed., Jan. 2000); Orentlicher, supra n. 30, at 663 (describing a 
fourth possible distinction "between assisted suicide and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment . . .  as a 
useful proxy, or substitute, for distinguishing between morally acceptable and morally unacceptable decisions 
by patients to end their lives."). 
43. Vacca, 521 U. S. at 797. 
44. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735. 
45. !d. at 724-26. 
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action, then they certainly do not have a right to receive assistance in performing that 
action. As it turns out, people do not have a right to commit suicide.46 Therefore people 
do not have a right to receive assistance in committing suicide. There are two main 
reasons that people do not have a right to commit suicide. The first reason: the 
prohibition against suicide is deeply rooted in "our Nation's history, legal traditions, and 
practices.',47 Similarly, most States, not to mention most Western democracies, have 
criminalized physician-assisted suicide.48 While not dispositive, this fact certainly casts 
some doubt on the notion that physician-assisted suicide is a right, no less a fundamental 
right.49 The second reason: the State has a compelling interest in prohibiting suicide­
namely, the preservation of human life, especially life that does not necessarily involve a 
future of illness and suffering. 50 
Third, Rehnquist argued that, in addition to the preservation of human life, the 
State has several other compelling interests that motivate prohibiting physician-assisted 
suicide. These other interests include "protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical 
profession";51 "protecting vulnerable groups-including the poor, the elderly, and 
disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, . . .  mistakes . .. coercion . .. prejudice, negative 
and inaccurate stereotypes, and 'societal indifference'";52 and protecting society against 
rolling down the slippery slope from physician-assisted suicide to "voluntary and 
perhaps even involuntary euthanasia."53 (These concerns will be discussed further in 
Part IV below.) 
Regarding this last point, a doctor commits involuntary euthanasia when she 
performs euthanasia without the patient's informed consent54 and voluntary euthanasia 
when she performs euthanasia with the patient's informed consent.55 Because 
involuntary euthanasia "would never be ethically acceptable,"56 we need no further 
explanation why Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected it. But why did he reject voluntary 
euthanasia as well? Although he did not give the reason, Rehnquist most likely had in 
mind scenarios in which a doctor, for her own ulterior reasons, helps suicidal patients to 
die unnecessarily early-i.e., when these patients are suffering not from terminal 
illnesses or incurable pain but rather from depression that might very well have been 
treated. This kind of euthanasia-though voluntary-would still be highly undesirable 
because it would lead to the deaths of patients who, had they resisted or been forced to 
resist their suicidal impulses, might very well have overcome their depression and gone 
46. !d. at 711. 
47. !d. at 710,711-14. 
48. !d. at 710-11,714-18. 
49. !d. at 723, 728; see also Gonzales, Petr.'s Br., 2005 WL 1126079 at *24 (May 12, 2005) (indicating that 
"Congress passed a broad ban on the federal funding of assisted suicide" in 1997 and that "physician-assisted 
suicide is not eligible for reimbursement under Medicare because it is 'not reasonable and necessary to the 
diagnosis and treatment of disease or injury"' (citation omitted)). 
50. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-29. 
51. !d. at 731. 
52. !d. at 731-32 (citation omitted). 
53. !d. at 732. 
54. Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. I, at 2229. 
55. Jd. 
56. !d. 
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on to lead fulfilling and productive lives. 57 
2. Concurring Opinions 
Four Justices-Souter, Breyer, O'Connor, and Stevens-offered concurring 
opinions in Glucksberg. All of them drew attention to a third possibility "in between" 
physician-assisted suicide, which they agreed is not constitutionally protected, and 
refusal of lifesaving medical treatment, which is constitutionally protected. 58 This third 
possibility, which was already discussed in Part I.B above, was a doctor's administering 
to terminally ill patients suffering excruciating pain palliative drugs that have the side 
effect of hastening death.59 The point that all four Justices made with this third 
possibility is that it is legal, at least in New York and Washington, and therefore renders 
physician-assisted suicide unnecessary. Even if doctors do not have the option of 
prescribing lethal drugs for terminally ill patients, they may achieve a similar outcome 
by prescribing palliative but death-hastening treatment instead. Of course, this argument 
would fail for any State that decided to criminalize palliative but death-hastening 
treatment. But because no State has yet legislated any such prohibition, the Justices 
remained content with the status quo.60 
3. Justice Stevens' Concurring Opinion 
Justice Stevens was the only member of the Court to recognize that the very 
legality of palliative but death-hastening treatment has important implications for what 
would later become a central issue in Gonzales: the purpose of medicine. Justice 
Stevens stated: 
The fear is that a rule permitting physicians to assist in suicide is inconsistent with the 
perception that they serve their patients solely as healers. But for some patients, it would 
be a physician's refusal to dispense medication to ease their suffering and make their death 
tolerable and dignified that would be inconsistent with the healing role. . . . [B]ecause 
physicians are already involved in making decisions that hasten the death of terminally ill 
patients--through termination of life support, withholding of medical treatment, and 
57. See also Glucksherg, 52! U.S. at 782-86 (Souter, J., concurring). 
58. ld. at 737-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 751 (Stevens, J., concurring), 780 (Souter, J., concurring), 
791-92 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
59. But see New York State Task Force, supra n. 42, at 109 n. 115 (noting that the National Hospice 
Organization has adopted a resolution that '"reaffirms the hospice philosophy that hospice care neither hastens 
nor postpones death"' (citation omitted)). 
60. But see Vacco, Respt. 's Br., 1996 WL 708912 at **8-9 (Dec. 10, 1996) (citations omitted): 
Palliative medication is of course available to ease many patients' physical pain. But it is 
undisputed that for others, especially those dying of some forms of cancer and those particularly 
near death, it may be impossible to relieve their excruciating pain or other physical symptoms. In 
addition, some patients may be unable to receive relief from pain because of their violent physical 
or psychological reactions to high doses of opiates. Palliative medication also has no effect on the 
suffering that may be brought on by a patient's own anguish, physical degeneration and loss of 
dignity. Further, at levels at which it may be effective, such medication may have the effect of 
impairing mental acuity. Many patients find--especially near the end--that they cannot obtain the 
required level of pain relief before losing whatever clarity of mind is otherwise left to them for 
communicating with loved ones, praying, or coming to terms with their impending death. Although 
these patients may be prepared to die, they are confronted instead only with intolerable 
suffering--the suffering of their own pain or of opiate-induced oblivion. 
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terminal sedation-there is in fact significant tension between the traditional view of the 
physician's role and the actual practice in a growing number of cases. 61 
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Justice Stevens was groping toward a significant insight. The passage above suggests 
that palliative but death-hastening treatment is both consistent and in "significant 
tension" with a doctor's "healing role." This apparent opposition, however, can be 
dissolved. Justice Stevens' point would have been more effective had he suggested that, 
in addition to healing, doctors serve another purpose as well: alleviation of suffering. 
For then Justice Stevens would not have had to try to fit the round peg of palliative but 
death-hastening treatment into the square hole of healing. Instead, he would have been 
able to fit this round peg into the equally round hole of alleviation. Moreover, as will be 
shown below, this suggestion would have had the fringe benefit of giving Justice 
Kennedy a strong point to use and Justice Scalia a compelling challenge to overcome in 
their respective Gonzales opinions. 
4. Justice Souter's Concurring Opinion 
In a part of his concurring opinion, Justice Souter strayed from the central 
constitutional questions to offer a public policy argument for the conclusion that 
criminalization of physician-assisted suicide is preferable to legalization. Justice Souter 
argued that some of the State interests mentioned by Chief Justice Rehnquist-namely, 
"protecting vulnerable groups" and protecting society against rolling down the slippery 
slope from physician-assisted suicide to "voluntary and perhaps even involuntary 
euthanasia"-were sufficient reasons for prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. Justice 
Souter based his argument on empirical evidence obtained from the Netherlands, one of 
the few countries that has legalized physician-assisted suicide. Studies showed that even 
Dutch laws permitting physician-assisted suicide that were layered with safeguards­
Jaws "with teeth"-had been unable to prevent these interests from being impaired. 
Justice Souter concluded from this data that, until sufficient countervailing evidence 
becomes available, the safer course is for States to continue prohibiting physician­
assisted suicide rather than passing Jaws, even "with teeth," that permit this (potentially) 
dangerous practice. 62 
D. Gonzales 
The central issue in Gonzales was whether or not the Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA)63 allowed "the United States Attorney General to prohibit doctors from 
prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide, notwithstanding a state 
Jaw permitting the procedure. "64 The Court held that CSA did not grant the Attorney 
General this power. Most of its decision was based on the application of canons of 
statutory interpretation to the text of CSA. 
61. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 748-49 (footnote omitted). 
62. Jd. at 782-87. 
63. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
64. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 911. 
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1. Case History 
A brief history of Gonzales is in order. In 1994, Oregon became the first State to 
pass a ballot measure legalizing physician-assisted suicide.65 The resulting Death with 
Dignity Act (DWDA)66 exempts from criminal or civil liability state-licensed physicians 
who, in compliance with DWDA's safeguards, dispense or prescribe lethal doses of 
drugs to terminally ill patients who wish to die. In 1997, Oregon voters reaffirmed 
Oregon's DWDA by rejecting a ballot measure proposing to invalidate it. 
On November 9, 2001, soon after Senator John Ashcroft had become the United 
States Attorney General, he issued a directive (the Ashcroft Directive) declaring that 
Oregon's DWDA conflicted with CSA and therefore was invalid.67 CSA, which 
Congress passed in 1970, was designed to combat drug abuse and control the legitimate 
and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances by creating a comprehensive regulatory 
regime criminalizing the unauthorized manufacture, distribution, dispensation, and 
possession of substances that are questionable insofar as they have a potential for abuse 
or dependence, do not have an accepted medical use, or are not considered sufficiently 
safe for use under medical supervision. Attorney General Ashcroft declared that 
substances prescribed by doctors for the purpose of assisting terminally ill patients to end 
their lives violated CSA. Therefore, contrary to Oregon's DWDA, "appropriate 
administrative action" could still be taken against doctors who issued such prescriptions. 
Attorney General Ashcroft based his interpretation of CSA on the application of 
two key concepts. The first came from a regulation issued in 1971 by then-Attorney 
General John Mitchell, which stated in part: "A prescription for a controlled substance to 
be effective must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner 
acting in the usual course of his professional practice."68 The second concept came from 
a 1984 congressional amendment to CSA, which authorized the Attorney General to 
revoke a physician's prescription privileges upon the determination that the physician 
has "committed such acts as would render his registration . . . inconsistent with the 
public interest."69 According to the amendment, an act is "inconsistent with the public 
interest" if it, among other things, "threatens the public health and safety."70 Attorney 
General Ashcroft held that substances prescribed for the purpose of assisting suicide fe11 
within the scope of substances prohibited by CSA because physician-assisted suicide 
does not serve a "legitimate medical purpose" and is therefore "inconsistent with the 
public interest."71 
On November 7, 2001, a doctor, a pharmacist, several terminally ill patients, and 
the State of Oregon challenged the Ashcroft Directive in the United States Court for the 
District of Oregon. On April 17, 2002, Judge Robert E. Jones entered a permanent 
65. Similar ballot measures had previously been rejected by voters in California and Washington State and 
later rejected by voters in Michigan. 
66. Or. Rev. Stat.§§ 127.800-127.995 (2005). 
67. 66 Fed. Reg. 56607-56608 (Nov. 9, 2001). 
68. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a)(2005). 
69. 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4). 
70. Jd. at § 823(f). 
71. Ashcroft Directive, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56608; see also Gonzales, Petr.'s Reply Br., 2005 WL 2083964 at 
**2-3, 19-20 (Aug. 25, 2005); Gonzales, Petr. ' s  Br., supra n. 49, at** 18-20. 
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injunction against enforcement of the Ashcroft Directive.72 On May 7, 2003, Attorney 
General Ashcroft appealed the injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. On May 26, 2004, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
injunction on the ground that the Ashcroft Directive "interferes with Oregon's authority 
to regulate medical care within its borders and therefore alter[s] the usual constitutional 
balance between the States and the Federal Government.'.73 On November 9, 2004, 
Attorney General Ashcroft, who was succeeded the next day by Alberto R. Gonzales, 
appealed the Court of Appeals' decision to the United States Supreme Court?4 On 
January 17, 2006, a divided Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision.75 
2. The Majority 
Justice Kennedy affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision primarily on the ground 
that CSA, appropriately interpreted, did not extend to substances prescribed for the 
purpose of physician�assisted suicide. Justice Kennedy said very little about physician­
assisted suicide itself. But the little he did say is noteworthy: 
In the face of the CSA's silence on the practice of medicine generally and its 
recognition of state regulation of the medical profession it is difficult to defend the 
Attorney General's declaration that the statute· impliedly criminalizes physician-assisted 
suicide. . . . A prescription, the Government argues, necessarily implies that the substance 
is being made available to a patient for a legitimate medical purpose. The statute, in this 
view, requires an anterior judgment about the term "medical" or "medicine." The 
Government contends ordinary usage of these words ineluctably refers to a healing or 
curative art, which by these terms cannot embrace the intentional hastening of a patient's 
death. It also points to the teachings of Hippocrates, the positions of prominent medical 
organizations, the Federal Government, and the judgment of the [forty-nine] States that 
have not legalized physician-assisted suicide as further support for the proposition that the 
practice is not legitimate medicine. 
On its own, this understanding of medicine's boundaries is at least reasonable. The 
primary problem with the Government's argument, however, is its assumption that the 
CSA impliedly authorizes an Executive officer to bar a use simply because it may be 
inconsistent with one reasonable understanding of medical practice. Viewed alone, the 
prescription requirement may support such an understanding, but statutes "should not be 
read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions." The CSA's substantive provisions 
and their arrangement undermine this assertion of an expansive federal authority to 
I d. . 76 regu ate me tcme. 
Justice Kennedy, then, conceded that one "reasonable" interpretation of the purpose of 
medicine is to heal, which includes preventing, curing, and curbing illness, disease, and 
injury. But implicit in Justice Kennedy's expression "one reasonable understanding of 
72. Or. v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080 (D. Or. 2002). 
73. Jd. at 1124 (quoting Greg01y v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(brackets in original). 
74. Gonzales, No. 04-623 (U.S. filed Nov. 9, 2004). 
75. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 926. 
76. I d. at 924 (citations omitted). 
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medical practice" were the assumptions that, in addition to healing, medicine may serve 
another reasonable purpose, and physician-assisted suicide may be consistent with this 
other purpose. Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy failed to explain what this alternative 
legitimate medical purpose might be. Moreover, Justice Kennedy failed to explain how 
it might be the case that physician-assisted suicide does not threaten the public health 
and safety and is thereby consistent with the public interest. 
3. The Dissent 
Justice Scalia's dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Thomas, capitalized on these omissions.77 The majority's failure to offer a legitimate 
medical purpose other than healing or an explanation of how physician-assisted suicide 
might not threaten the public health and safety left Justice Scalia free to claim victory for 
the Attorney General's unchallenged interpretations: 
[E]ven if [the Attorney General's] interpretation of ["legitimate medical purpose"] is 
entitled to lesser deference or no deference at all, it is by far the most natural interpretation 
of [this phrase}-whose validity is not challenged here. This interpretation is thus correct 
even upon de novo review. [And] even if that interpretation of ["legitimate medical 
purpose"] were incorrect, the Attorney General's independent interpretation of the 
statutory phrase "public interest" in 21 U.S.C. §§ 824(a) and 823(f), and his implicit 
interpretation of the statutory phrase "public health and safety" in § 823(f)(5), are entitled 
to deference . . and they are valid. 78 
Justice Scalia spent most of his opinion explaining why deference should be given 
to the Attorney General's interpretation of CSA and of its incompatibility with 
physician-assisted suicide. For the most part, he argued that deference was owed to the 
Attorney General not necessarily because his interpretations were correct but because 
both the text of CSA and prior cases-namely Auer v. Robbins 79 and Chevron US.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 80 -mandated this deference. 8 1  
Still, Justice Scalia did maintain that, regardless of deference issues, the Attorney 
General's interpretations were correct. In particular, Justice Scalia offered three quick 
arguments-or, more precisely, one argument and two assertions-in defense of the 
Attorney General's thesis that the only legitimate medical purpose is healing and 
therefore that CSA clearly ruled out physician-assisted suicide. Justice Scalia's only 
argument was to reiterate the Attorney General's own appeal to authority. Justice Scalia 
stated that "[ v ]irtually every relevant source of authoritative meaning," including 
"virtually every medical authority from Hippocrates to the current American Medical 
77. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 926 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
78. !d. at 926 (citations omitted). 
79. 5 19  U.S. 452 ( 1 997). 
80. 467 u.s. 837 ( 1 984). 
8 1 .  In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas also argued that deference should be given to the Attorney 
General's interpretations of CSA. Like Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas argued that this deference was mandated 
by CSA. ld. at 940 (Thomas, J. dissenting). But Justice Thomas also argued that the Supreme Court's decision 
in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. I (2005)-a case that entailed the Attorney General's interpretations of 
CSA-was inconsistent with the majority's decision in Gonzales. !d. at 939-4 1 .  
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Association (AMA)," suggests that the sole purpose of medicine is to heal.82 The first of 
Justice Scalia's assertions was that "[n]ot even those of our Eighth Amendment cases 
most generous in discerning an 'evolution' of national standards would have found, on 
this record, that the concept of 'legitimate medicirte' has evolved so far."83 The second 
of Justice Scalia's assertions was that healing is the only meaning that "legitimate 
medical purpose" could have, and this meaning "surely excludes the prescription of 
drugs to produce death. "84 
III. ETHICAL ISSUES 
It is not clear whether or not there is a larger significance to Justice Kennedy's 
point in Gonzales that there may be legitimate medical purposes other than healing. At 
the very least, Justice Kennedy is suggesting that the worry that physician-assisted 
suicide is incompatible with a doctor's role as healer is not dispositive, that States may 
still permit physician-assisted suicide without necessarily violating the fundamental 
purposes of medicine. But is this point also meant to reopen the very door that Vacca 
and Glucksberg apparently closed? Again, Vacca and Glucksberg both held that 
terminally ill patients do not have a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. Is 
Gonzales meant to be the first step in undoing Vacca and Glucksberg and revisiting this 
question? 
Of course, we can only speculate as to what the Court's underlying motivations are 
and how it will decide future cases questioning the constitutionality of laws either 
permitting or prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. This article does not attempt to 
engage in any such psychoanalysis or palm reading. Instead, it remains on the safer 
ground of argument and textual interpretation. The thesis of this part is that, whether or 
not the Court intends to reconsider if tenninally ill patients have a constitutional right to 
physician-assisted suicide, it has not offered theoretically satisfYing answers to two 
critical questions. The first question: does physician-assisted suicide have a legitimate 
medical purpose? The second question: is there a meaningful morally relevant 
distinction between physician-assisted suicide, which the Court stated in Vacca and 
Glucksberg may be criminalized, and withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment, which 
the Court stated in Cruzan is a constitutionally protected right? 
A. Does Physician-Assisted Suicide Have a Legitimate Medical Purpose? 
In Glucksberg, there was a scuffle between Justices Kennedy and Scalia over 
whether or not physician-assisted suicide serves a legitimate medical purpose. Justice 
Ketmedy suggested that it may but failed to mention what this legitimate medical 
purpose might be. And Justice Scalia suggested that the only legitimate medical purpose 
is healing and therefore that physician-assisted suicide, which is designed not to heal but 
to do the very opposite-kill- falls outside the legitimate boundaries of medicine. 
82. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 932; see also Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra n. 6; New York State Task 
Force, supra n. 42, at I 05-08. 
83. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 932 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
84. Id. at 939. 
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1. The Hippocratic Oath 
Justice Scalia based his position that physician-assisted suicide does not serve a 
legitimate medical purpose largely on a June 27, 2001 memorandum from the Office of 
Legal Counsel at the U.S. Department of Justice to Attorney General Ashcroft (OLC 
Memorandum). 85 The OLC Memorandum derived this position from a number of 
sources, including the AMA and the American Nurses Association.86 These agencies 
themselves relied largely on the Hippocratic Oath. 
There are two versions of the Hippocratic Oath-ancient and modem. The ancient 
version, which was written in the fifth century B.C. by Hippocrates, states in part that 
"[n]either will I administer a poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I suggest 
such a course."87 The modem version, written by Dr. Louis Lasagna in 1964, states in 
part: 
Most especially must I tread with care in matters of life and death. If it is given to me to 
save a life, all thanks. But it may also be within my power to take a life; this awesome 
responsibility must be faced with great humbleness and awareness of my own frailty. 
Above all, I must not play at God.88 
The ancient version directly conflicts with physician-assisted suicide. But there 
are several reasons why the ancient version does not present a very strong basis for 
current opposition to physician-assisted suicide. First, candidates for the license to 
practice medicine no longer recite, or need to recite, the ancient version.89 Rather, they 
generally recite the modem version.90 Second, Hippocrates inserted the clause above 
("[n]either will I . . . such a course") into the oath largely to "prevent[] physicians from 
participating in political intrigues.'m This concern is no longer relevant. Third, there is 
85. Memo. from U.S. Dept. of Just., Off. of Leg. Counsel, to Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft, Whether Physician­
Assisted Suicide Serves a "Legitimate Medical Purpose" under the Drug Enforcement Administration's 
Regulations Implementing the Controlled Substances Act (June 27, 2001) Others who base their opposition to 
physician-assisted suicide at least in part on the Hippocratic Oath include the Council on Ethical & Jud. 
Affairs, Physician-Assisted Suicide, 10 Issues L. & Med. 91 (1994); Willard Gaylin, Leon R. Kass, Edmund D. 
Pellegrino & Mark Siegler, "Doctors Must Not Kill", 259 J. Am. Med. Assn. 2139 (1988); John C. Harvey, 
Doctors Must Not Kill, Am. J. Ethics & Med. 9 (1993); Leon R. Kass, Neither for Love nor Money: Why 
Doctors Must Not Kill, 94 Pub. Interest 25 (1989); Kass, supra n. 36, at 31-32; Charles L. Sprung, Changing 
Attitudes and Practices in Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatments, 263 J. Am. Med. Assn. 2211 (1990); Avraham 
Steinberg, The Terminally Ill--,Secular and Jewish Ethical Aspects, 30 Isr. J. Med. Sci. 130 (1994); see also 
Stephen Jamison, Assisted Suicide: A Decision-Making Guide for Health Professionals 20 (Jossey-Bass 1997); 
Ernie W.D. Young, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Overview of the Ethical Debate, 166 W. J. Med. 402, 403-04 
(1997). 
86. OLC Memorandum, supra n. 85, at 11-13. The AMA stated its position in Glucksberg, Amicus Br., 
1996 WL 656263 (Nov. 12, 1996), and in H.R. Subcomm. on Canst. of the H. Comm. on the Jud., Assisted 
Suicide in the United States, 104th Cong. 521-66 (Apr. 29, 1996) (testimony of Lonnie L. Bristow, M.D., Pres., 
AMA) (available at 1996 WL 226114). The American Nurses Association stated its position at the same 
hearing and in its Position Statement on Assisted Suicide, http:/lwww.nursingworld.org/readroom/ 
position/ethics/ prtetsuic.htm (Dec. 8, 1994). 
87. Ethics in Medicine: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Concerns 5 (Stanley Joel Reiser, Arthur 
J. Dyck & William J. Curran eds., student ed., MIT Press 1977). 
88. Nova Online, Hippocratic Oath-Modern Version, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/ 
oath_modem.html (updated Mar. 2001). 
89. Nova Online, The Hippocratic Oath Today: Meaningless Relic or Invaluable Moral Guide, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/ oath_today.html (updated Mar. 2001). 
90. /d. 
91. Erich H. Loewy, Textbook of Medical Ethics 146 (Plenum Publg. Corp. 1989). 
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no good reason to think that Hippocrates is a definitive, authoritative source on the 
fundamental principles of medical ethics. His view is just as contestable as any other 
medical ethicist's view .92 Fourth, the principles of medical ethics are not necessarily 
timeless but rather vary with context, society, and technology. These three things have 
dramatically changed since Hippocrates' time. 
Unlike the ancient version, the modem version does not clearly rule out physician­
assisted suicide. First, to suggest that a physician must "tread with care in matters of life 
and death" still leaves open the possibility of a physician's  carefully terminating her 
patient's life. Second, the suggestion that the "awesome responsibility" of "tak[ing] a 
life" "must be faced with great humbleness and awareness of my own frailty" directly 
suggests that the physician must sometimes decide whether or not to take a patient's life, 
which itself implies that the physician is sometimes morally permitted to decide in favor 
of termination. Third, if the statement that the physician "must not play at God" were 
taken to be a categorical ban on physician-assisted suicide, then it would contradict the 
previous statements' implications, which have just been noted above.93 Given the 
previous statements, a more plausible interpretation of this last statement is that the 
physician should not make the decision based solely on her own judgment. Rather, she 
should also take into account the wishes, interests, and circumstances of the patient and 
the patient's family. Finally, many physicians who have subscribed to the principles 
embodied by the Hippocratic Oath believe that physician-assisted suicide is morally 
permissible.94 And it would be both highly cynical and arrogant to think that any, no 
92. This third argument applies not merely to modern society but also to the ancient Greeks themselves. 
According to Erich H. Loewy and Roberta Springer Loewy, The Ethics of Terminal Care: Orchestrating the 
End of Life I 07 (Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers 2000), many physicians in ancient times did not 
subscribe to Hippocrates' medical ethical principles. See also Darrel W. Amundsen, The Significance of 
Inaccurate History in Legal Considerations of Physician-Assisted Suicide, in Physician-Assisted Suicide 3, 25-
26 (Robert F. Weir ed., Ind. U. Press 1 997) (maintaining that the early Christians did not categorically reject 
the practices of euthanasia, suicide, and physician-assisted suicide but instead barely discussed or considered 
them). 
93. Jean Davies makes a very interesting observation in this context: 
The emptiness of [assertions like "[ o ]nly God can give or take life" and "[ w ]e cannot play God"] in 
relation to actual medical practice can be seen in the determined (and laudable) attempts that are 
made to restore to health those hovering on the brink of death by reason of accident or treatable 
infection. In fact the whole practice of medicine could be defined as one long struggle to prevent 
"Nature taking its course." 
Jean Davies, The Case for Legalizing Voluntary Euthanasia, in Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and 
Legal Perspectives 83, 90 (John Keown ed., Cambridge U. Press 1 995). 
94. Physicians who support physician-assisted suicide include Lofty L. Basta & Carole Post, A Graceful 
Exit: Life and Death on Your Own Terms (Insight Bks. 1996); Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92. Orentlicher, 
supra n. 30, at 666, offers evidence that there is widespread support for physician-assisted suicide among 
modern physicians. See also Melinda A. Lee & Susan W. Tolle, Oregon 's Assisted Suicide Vote: The Silver 
Lining, 124 Annals Internal Med. 267 ( 1 996). Harold Y. Vanderpool, Doctors and the Dying of Patients in 
American History, in Physician-Assisted Suicide 33, 37 (Robert F. Weir ed., Ind. U. Press 1 997), points out 
that, far from uniformly opposing euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, the medical community has hotly 
contested these issues since at least the 1 870s. Vanderpool also offers the names of many physicians and 
medically related organizations that have practiced or advocated euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide 
since that time. In more or less chronological order, they include Samuel D. Williams, T.T. Robertson, the 
American Association of Progressive Medicine, Alfred Worchester, William Sperry, Walter C. Alvarez, Joseph 
Fletcher, Edward H. Rynearson, Frank J. Ayd, Paul Ramsey, Norman L. Cantor, Thomas W. Furlow, Jr., the 
1 983 Report of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, Sisella Bok, Derek Humphry, the Hemlock Society, and the Unitarian Universalist 
Association. 
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less all, of these physicians are guilty of either unwitting self-contradiction or false 
consciousness. 
2. The Fundamental Purposes of Medicine 
When they are not appealing to the Hippocratic Oath, the sources that Justice 
Scalia cites in favor of the proposition that healing is the only purpose of medicine 
appeal to something even weaker-bald assertion. They merely assert that the only 
purpose of medicine is to heal-to prevent, cure, or curb illness, disease, and injury.95 
This objective clearly conflicts with physician-assisted suicide, which is designed to do 
the very opposite-not heal the patient but end her life. 
This perspective, however, is myopic. In addition to healing, medicine has at least 
one other main purpose: to alleviate physical or emotional suffering. One need merely 
consider the universal acceptance of palliative care (e.g., hospice treatment).96 And 
when it comes to terminally ill patients who suffer excruciating pain and wish to die, the 
"healing purpose" may conflict with the "alleviation purpose." That is, a physician 
treating a terminally ill patient who is suffering excruciating pain and wishes to die may 
not be able to satisfy both purposes. In this limiting case, she may just have to choose 
between them. She may just have to violate a fundamental purpose of medicine. On the 
one hand, if she opts for healing the patient, she may thereby prolong or intensify the 
patient's physical and emotional suffering. On the other hand, the only way in which the 
physician may be able to alleviate the patient's suffering is by terminating her life. So it 
is disingenuous for opponents of physician-assisted suicide to suggest that it violates a 
fundamental purpose of medicine. In certain situations, fai/ing to terminate the patient's 
life might also violate a fundamental purpose of medicine.97 
Non-physicians who also support physician-assisted suicide include Margaret Pabst Battin, The Least 
Worst Death: Essays in Bioethics on the End of Life (Oxford U. Press 1 994); Raphael Cohen-Almagor, The 
R ight to Die with Dignity: An Argument in Ethics, Medicine, and Law (Rutgers U. Press 2001); Davies, supra 
n. 93. 
95. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 931-32 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
96. Even the Ashcroft Directive, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56608, recognizes this point: "Pain management . . .  has 
long been recognized as a legitimate medical purpose justifying physicians' dispensing of controlled 
substances." See also Daniel Callahan, Reason, Self-determination, and Physician-Assisted Suicide, in Foley & 
Hendin, supra n. 7, at 59 ("What [medicine] can do is relieve pain and bring comfort to those who 
psychologically suffer because of illness."); Kass, supra n. 36, at 2 1  ("[T]he physician is called to serve the 
high and universal goal of health while also ministering to the needs and relieving the sufferings of the frail and 
particular patient."). 
97. See Cohen-Almagor, supra n. 94, at 1 84-85, 1 86; Jamison, supra n. 85, at 19-20, 24-25; Loewy & 
Loewy, supra n. 92, at 1 1 3-14; Howard Brody, Assisted Death-A Compassionate Response to a Medical 
Failure, 327 New Engl. J. Med. 1 384 (1 992); Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. I ,  at 2230; Ezekiel J. 
Emanuel, Euthanasia: Historical, Ethical, and Empiric Perspectives, 1 54 Archives Internal Med. 1 890, 1 893 
( 1 994); institute of Medical Ethics Working Party on the Ethics of Prolonging Life and Assisting Death, 336 
Lancet 6 1 0, 6 1 3  (1 990); Winston Nesbitt, Euthanasia and the Distinction between Acts and Omissions, 1 0  J. 
Applied Phil. 253 (1 993); Orentlicher, supra n. 30, at 664; Robert F. Weir, The Morality of Physician-Assisted 
Suicide, 20 L., Med. & Health Care 1 1 6, 123 ( 1 992). But see Kass, supra n. 36, at 34-35 (challenging Jhe 
notion that medicine serves the goal, among others, of "helping patients achieve a peaceful death"). 
' 
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B. Is There a Morally Relevant Distinction between Physician-Assisted Suicide and 
Withdrawal of Lifesaving Medical Treatment? 
The Vacca Court held that there is a significant moral (and constitutional) 
difference between a doctor's withdrawing lifesaving medical treatment from a 
terminally ill patient and a doctor's prescribing lethal drugs for a terminally ill patient. Is 
this decision correct? Is there really a difference? If so, what is it?98 
We have already come across three proposed answers to these questions from 
Chief Justice Rehnquist in his Vacca opinion. First, while a doctor who prescribes lethal 
drugs to her patient intends to help her die, a doctor who withdraws life support from her 
patient intends only to respect the patient's autonomy and dignity. Second, while 
physician-assisted suicide involves the patient's dying from the drug prescribed by her 
doctor, withdrawal involves the patient's dying from the underlying illness. Third, only 
prohibiting withdrawal, not prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, violates the patient's 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. 
1 .  The First Distinction: Intent 
The first two distinctions are quite weak. Regarding intent, a physician who 
prescribes lethal drugs to her patient is not necessarily, or usually, some evildoer who 
rubs her hands together with glee at the prospect that her patient might soon be dead. 
And even if we assume that she is, we have no reason not to assume the same about the 
doctor who withdraws her patient from life support, in which case this practice should be 
illegal as well. If, however, we assume what we should-namely, that the doctor who 
fulfills her patient's wishes to remove life support does so almost invariably not from 
some evil motive but simply out of a respect and concern for her patient's autonomy­
then we have no reason not to assume the very same about the doctor who prescribes 
lethal drugs for her patient. We have no reason not to assume that she prescribes lethal 
drugs out of the very same respect and concern for her patient 's  autonomy. But if we 
may-and should-make these assumptions, then Chief Justice Rehnquist's first 
distinction fails. All else being equal, there is no difference between the intent of a 
doctor who removes unwanted lifesaving medical treatment from her patient and the 
intent of a doctor who prescribes lethal drugs for her patient.99 
2. The Second Distinction: Causation 
Regarding causation, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated what is undeniable-namely, 
that the cause of the death of a patient from whom lifesaving medical treatment is 
98. See Dworkin, supra n. 19, at 1 84 (footnote omitted): 
[T]he law produces the apparently irrational result that people can choose to die lingering deaths by 
refusing to eat, by refusing treatment that keeps them alive, or by being disconnected from 
respirators and suffocating, but they cannot choose a quick, painless death that their doctors could 
easily provide. Many people, including many doctors, think that this distinction is not irrational but, 
on the contrary, essential. They think that doctors should in no circumstances be killers. But to 
many other people, that principle seems cruelly abstract. 
99. David Lavalle makes a similar point about the patient 's intent. David Lavalle, Physician-Assisted 
Suicide: Is There a Right to Die? 31 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 945, 973 (1998) . 
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withdrawn is her underlying illness. Where Rehnquist went wrong was in assuming that 
the cause of such a patient' s  death must be confined to only one causal factor. In fact, 
there is another-quite obvious-factor that equally contributed to this patient' s  death: 
removal of her life support. Once we acknowledge this second, equally important, 
causal factor, the purported distinction that Chief Justice Rehnquist drew between 
causation by physician-assisted suicide and causation by withdrawal breaks down 
entirely. For just as it is misleading to say that the cause of the death of a patient from 
whom life support has been removed is her underlying illness, it is equally misleading to 
say that the cause of the death of a patient who has administered to herself a lethal drug 
prescribed by that doctor is the lethal drug. Clearly, her terminal illness also plays a 
causal role. It causes her the great suffering that motivates her to take the drug in the 
first place. 1 00 
Opponents of physician-assisted suicide might argue that this description 
overlooks an obvious temporal distinction between the two cases. On the one hand, 
when the doctor removes life support, the patient normally does not die immediately. 
There is some gap of time, however small, between the removal of life support and the 
patient's death. What intervenes in that gap is the patient' s illness. So it is more precise 
to say that the patient's  illness is the immediate cause of her death, removal of life 
support "only" the distant cause. And in this sense, the cause of the patient' s  death is her 
illness. The same, however, cannot be said of the patient who commits suicide by means 
of a lethal drug prescribed by her doctor. The immediate cause-and therefore the 
cause-of her death is the drug itself, not her illness. 
But this is a distinction without a difference. The point of Rehnquist's distinction 
between causation-of-death in the physician-assisted suicide scenario and causation-of­
death in the withdrawal scenario is that the latter is somehow more benign, and therefore 
more tolerable, than the former. But it is arbitrary to make this normative judgment 
about benignity or tolerability on the basis of the immediate cause alone. There is no 
good reason to think that the immediate cause alone carries such importance. On the 
contrary, if causation is to be considered at all, this normative judgment should instead 
be based not merely on the immediate cause but on the larger process or causal history or 
chain of events behind this immediate cause. Once we take this larger chain of events 
into consideration, we see that the two scenarios should be judged equally. For both 
chains of events share two key features-both of which are sufficient to determine our 
normative judgments. First, the patient's  wishes initiate both chains of events. It is the 
patient who asks her doctor to remove life support or to prescribe lethal drugs. Second, 
in both chains of events, the doctor serves as merely a means to the end of fulfilling the 
patient' s  wishes. It does not matter how she fulfills the patient's  wishes, whether by 
removing life support or by prescribing lethal drugs. This is merely a technical issue, not 
a moral issue. 1 0 1  
I 00. !d. at 973. 
101. It might be objected that it does matter how the doctor fulfills the patient's wishes. Clearly, if the 
patient wishes to die, the doctor may not fire a pistol at her. And this is so even if the patient wishes to be shot 
to death. But this objection requires only a simple qualification. The doctor must use non-violent means to 
achieve the end of fulfilling her patient's wish to die. Prescribing a lethal drug clearly qualifies as non-violent 
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Opponents of physician-assisted suicide might respond that we should focus 
exclusively on the immediate cause of death because that will tell us whether the patient 
died from natural causes or from human intervention. And it is clearly preferable that 
patients die from natural causes than from human intervention. 
While this argument is rhetorically seductive, it is substantively bankrupt. It is 
rhetorically seductive because it relies on very powerful connotations. But it is 
substantively blmkrupt because these connotations are inapplicable in the context of 
physician-assisted suicide. On the one hand, death by natural causes connotes 
peacefulness and unavoidability. On the other hand, death by human intervention 
connotes violence and avoidability. But, again, these connotations are simply 
inapplicable in this context. While a death by prescribed lethal drugs is a death by 
human intervention-the doctor and the patient herself-it is certainly not violent. It is 
therefore not deplorable, even if it is tragic. Moreover, if one argues that death by 
natural causes is preferable to physician-assisted suicide, then one is in effect making the 
arguably cruel suggestion that patients should be forced to endure longer, possibly much 
longer, periods of suffering for no better reason than to avoid the pejorative implications 
of human intervention, implications that simply do not apply in the context of euthanasia. 
Finally, opponents of physician-assisted suicide might argue that the causal 
distinction between death by physician-assisted suicide and death by removal of life 
support is morally relevant. For a doctor who practices physician-assisted suicide helps 
to kill her patient. But a doctor who removes life support from her patient merely lets 
her patient die. And there is a clear moral difference between killing and letting die. All 
else being equal, killing is (much) worse than letting die.1 02 
There are, however, two problems with this argument against physician-assisted 
suicide. First, not everybody agrees with it.1 03 On the contrary, whether or not, all else 
being equal, killing is worse than letting die is a very difficult and hotly contested 
philosophical question.104 Because it is so difficult and contested, it (alone) should not 
be allowed to decide the debate on physician-assisted suicide. 
Second, in the context of euthanasia, the distinction between killing and letting die 
because it does not inflict any external injury on the patient and may be self-administered by the patient. 
I 02. For example, before Vacca went up to the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that there is no principled distinction between physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of lifesaving medical 
treatment. In particular, it held that New York statutes that allowed the withdrawal of lifesaving medical 
treatment but prohibited physician-assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause. Quill v. Vacca, 80 
F.2d 7 1 6, 727 (2d Cir. 1996). For terminally ill patients on life-support systems are similarly situated to 
terminally ill patients who are not. So the only justification for allowing only the former to terminate their 
lives would be a rationally related legitimate State interest. !d. at 729. According to the Second Circuit, such 
an interest simply does not exist. /d. at 729-30. 
103. For example, before Vacca went up to the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that there is no principled distinction between physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of lifesaving medical 
treatment. In particular, it held that New York statutes that allowed the withdrawal of lifesaving medical 
treatment but prohibited physician-assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause. Quill v. Vacca, 80 
F.2d 7 16, 727 (2d Cir. 1 996). For terminally ill patients on life-support systems are similarly situated to 
terminally ill patients who are not. So the only justification for allowing only the former to terminate their 
lives would be a rationally related legitimate State interest. Jd. at 729. According to the Second Circuit, such 
an interest simply does not exist. !d. at 729-30. 
I 04. See, for example, the variety of positions represented in Killing and Letting Die (Bonnie Steinbock and 
Alastair Norcross, eds., Fordham University Press 1994). 
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is not always clear. There are borderline situations that do not fall easily or obviously on 
either the "killing side" or the "letting die" side. Indeed, one situation that is not easily 
classified as either a killing (a positive action bringing about another's death) or a letting 
die (a failing to prevent another's death by refraining from performing a life-saving 
action) is withdrawal of life support itself. On the one hand, it may seem to be a letting 
die because, in terminating the life support, the physician is failing to prevent the 
patient's impending death. On the other hand, it may seem to be a killing because 
terminating the life support involves a positive action by the physician. 
The underlying problem is that we have no principled basis for determining the 
proper baseline--namely, whether or not the patient is already moving toward death. On 
the one hand, if we deem the patient already to be moving toward death, then the life 
support system constitutes an active interference. It does not continue but interrupts the 
movement. So if the physician terminates the life support, she merely removes this 
interruption and thereby lets the movement toward death continue. And to say that she 
lets the movement toward death continue is just to say that she lets the patient die. On 
the other hand, if we deem the patient not already to be moving toward death, then the 
physician's removing the life support system constitutes an active interference. She 
actively interrupts the patient's movement toward more life, in which case she may be 
said to kill the patient. 
3. The Third Distinction: The Consequences of Prohibition 
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist's third distinction-that prohibiting only 
withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment, not physician-assisted suicide, would violate 
patients' "well-established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from 
unwanted touching"1 05 -fails because it falsely assumes that the constitutional right to 
withdraw unwanted lifesaving medical treatment derives from "well-established, 
traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching." In fact, the 
majority opinion in Cruzan, which was also written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, did not 
really advance this proposition. Instead, Cruzan stated that patients' right to withdraw 
lifesaving medical treatment derived from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause, which secured their "liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatrnent."106 
So the right to withdraw unwanted lifesaving treatment was thought to derive not from a 
concern to protect bodily integrity per se but rather from a concern to protect liberty, 
which may safely be translated as a right to self-determination.107 Indeed, the text of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Cruzan contains only one mention of "bodily 
integrity," as contrasted with thirteen mentions of"liberty interest." 
Given this clarification, Rehnquist's third distinction collapses. Even if prohibiting 
physician-assisted suicide does not violate terminally ill patients' bodily integrity, it 
might still violate their right to self-determination. Because it might violate this right 
just as much as does prohibiting withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment, and because 
105. Vacca, 521 U.S. at 807 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79,287-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
106. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. 
107. See also Rawls et al., supra n. 8, at 44 ("The liberty interest at stake in Cntzan was a more profound 
one" than "a right to reject an unwanted invasion of one's body."). 
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prohibiting withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment is unconstitutional precisely 
because it violates this right, it follows that prohibition of physician-assisted suicide 
might very well be unconstitutional as wel1. 1 08 
One might object that this point leads to an absurdity. If terminally ill patients had 
a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide, then the State would be equally 
constitutionally obligated to provide a physician to each patient who sought this 
treatment and did not already have a doctor of her own. But is difficult to accept the 
notion that States would be constitutionally obligated to provide this affirmative medical 
assistance-especially when, for better or worse, they do not otherwise have a 
constitutional obligation to provide health care to those who cannot afford it. 109 
The appropriate response to this objection is that constitutional protection of 
physician-assisted suicide would not entail the positive right to be provided with a doctor 
if need be. Rather, it would entail only the negative right of non-interference-i.e., the 
right that States not interfere with any arrangements for physician-assisted suicide made 
by patients with their own doctors. 1 1  0 
IV. POLICY ISSUES 
Even though the Court ruled in Vacca and Glucksberg that patients do not have a 
constitutionally protected right to receive physician-assisted suicide, it does not at all 
follow that States should prohibit physician-assisted suicide. There are many actions and 
activities that are not constitutionally protected and yet are-and should be-perfectly 
legal. For example, individuals do not have a constitutional right to drive (no less have) 
a car. Yet it would be foolish for any State to interpret this absence of constitutional 
protection as a good reason to outlaw driving. In this respect, physician-assisted suicide 
is like driving. While we do not currently have a constitutional right to it, some 
advocates of physician-assisted suicide argue that we should still be permitted this option 
if we are ever in the unfortunate position of facing a future of unrelenting pain before a 
certain death. 
Why, then, does every State but Oregon still prohibit physician-assisted suicide? 
While some opposition to legalizing physician-assisted suicide may be rooted in some of 
108. See also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 298-99 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting Chief Justice Rehnquist's third 
distinction because its assumption that the State may not violate a patient's bodily integrity to save her life is 
both question-begging and, in many cases, false). Respondents in Vacca offered another argument against the 
third distinction: 
[Patients who have previously consented to bodily intrusions such as insertion of an artificial heart 
valve or a kidney or bone marrow transplant] may wish to die by withdrawing their consent to the 
bodily intrusion to which they have been subjected. But their cases demonstrate that the State's line 
is not about permitting patients to undo a battery. Even where withdrawal of consent is theoretically 
possible, the State would doubtless say that a patient has no right to end his own life by insisting, for 
example, that surgeons remove a donor kidney or heart that had already been implanted. On the 
other hand, if the State did permit this type of life-ending physician assistance, how could it argue 
that it is rational not to permit the same patient to obtain a lethal dose of medication from a 
physician for the same ultimate purpose? 
Vacco, Respt. 's Br., supra n. 60, at 47 (emphasis in original). 
1 09. See, e.g. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 3 1 7- 1 8  ( 1 980) (The Due Process Clause does not impose an 
obligation on the government to fund abortions or other medical services.). 
1 1 0. Orentlicher, supra n. 30, at 664. 
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the weaker arguments that we have encountered above-e.g., physician-assisted suicide, 
unlike withdrawal of unwanted life support, involves killing or the intent to kill-the 
stronger arguments derive less from moral considerations and more from a practical 
worry. The practical worry is that legalizing physician-assisted suicide will have serious 
negative effects on patients, physicians, medical practice, and society in general. This 
part will explicate what these negative effects might be. 
A. The Strongest Policy Arguments for Physician-Assisted Suicide 
It would help first to see the strongest policy arguments for physician-assisted 
suicide. Suppose an elderly woman-Lisa-is terminally ill with no chance of recovery, 
suffers excruciating pain, and has decided, after much careful thought and deliberation 
with her family and friends, that she wishes to die. Suppose also that Lisa does not 
depend on artificial life support; has no more than six months to live; is not pressured or 
coerced by anybody else to end her life; and is fully conscious and mentall� competent. 
So far, Lisa's decision to commit suicide-whether physician-assisted or not-seems as 
rational and voluntary as such a decision can ever be. 1 1 1  Committing suicide would 
maximize Lisa's autonomy by maximizing her control over how and when her 
impending death occurs; both Lisa' preference for no suffering to suffering and her belief 
that death is the only means to this end are reasonable; and Lisa reasonably believes that 
her family supports her decision for the right reasons-because they too wish her 
suffering to end and not to spare them the burden of taking care of her or save them the 
expense of Lisa's continued medical care. 
What, then, justifies the inference from the fact that Lisa's decision to commit 
suicide is rational and voluntary to the conclusion that physician-assisted suicide is 
warranted? Why should Lisa's method of suicide involve a physician's prescription of a 
lethal medication? Why can't Lisa terminate her life in some other way? An analogy 
with abortion might help to answer these questions. Most "pro-choice" advocates-i.e., 
advocates for keeping the option of abortion legal-argue that if abortion were made 
illegal, many pregnant women would then seek "back-alley" abortions. And back-alley 
abortions are undesirable for two primary reasons, one practical, the other moral. The 
practical reason is that the individuals performing the back-alley abortions are likely to 
lack the knowledge, skill, and resources necessary to perform safe abortion procedures 
and would therefore expose these women to serious bodily injuries. The moral reason is 
I l l . It has been suggested to me in personal conversation that a patient's decision to terminate her life while 
undergoing a sharp surge of pain is not rational . My response to this point is that the patient's decision is 
rational if the patient has been informed by her doctor that she is terminally ill and can reasonably expect to 
suffer this level of pain, either constantly or continuously, until death. Moreover, even if this decision is 
irrational, all fifty States allow such alleged irrationality in the case of withdrawal of lifesaving medical 
treatment. Scholars who accept the proposition that a patient can rationally request physician-assisted suicide 
include Robert L. Barry, Breaking the Thread of Life: On Rational Suicide (Transaction Publishers 1 994) and 
Jamison, supra n. 85, at 42 ("The overwhelming majority of mental health professionals, according to surveys 
conducted by James Werth and Barbara Liddle, believe that individuals can make rational decisions to control 
the time and manner of their deaths."); see also Justice Stevens' concurrence in Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 747 
(patients may make a "rational and voluntary decision to seek assistance in dying."). Scholars who reject this · 
proposition (i.e., those who accept what Jamison, supra n. 85, at 4 1 ,  refers to as the "traditional view") include 
Callahan, supra n. 96, at 66-67; Kathleen Foley (testifying before Congress in 1 996), Herbert Hendin (of The 
American Suicide Foundation), Kass, supra n. 36, at 24-25. 
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that the illegal status of these abortions would imply that society rega,rds abortions in 
general-and therefore the women undergoing these back-alley abortions-as morally 
reprehensible. And pro-choice advocates reject both this moral conclusion and the 
assumption that society endorses this moral conclusion. 
Advocates of physician-assisted suicide would likely argue that keeping this 
practice illegal produces practical dangers and conveys the wrong message. The 
practical danger is that patients will seek to end their lives in ways that may not be 
effective, thereby complicating their situation and quite possibly increasing the 
patients'-and their families'-suffering. And the message conveyed by keeping 
physician-assisted suicide illegal is that it is wrong for doctors to help patients like Lisa 
end their lives. But advocates of physician-assisted suicide argue that Lisa's doctor is 
doing the right thing by helping Lisa to execute her fully rational and family-supported 
decision. That is precisely what doctors should do. After all, doctors routinely 
implement, as they should, their patients' decisions to terminate lifesaving medical care 
and administer palliative but death-hastening treatment. And there is no principled 
distinction between these two methods and physician-assisted suicide. In all three 
situations, a patient asks her doctor to help alleviate her suffering, and the doctor respects 
her patient's request by prescribing, dispensing, and/or administering to her patient a 
drug that has the reasonably foreseeable effect of causing the patient to die earlier than 
she would have without the drug. 
Moreover, physician-assisted suicide has a distinctive advantage over withdrawal 
of lifesaving medical treatment and administration of palliative but death-hastening 
treatment: it liberates the patient from any sense that she is committed to carrying 
through with her decision to terminate her life. If a patient decides to administer the 
lethal substance to herself, she may still change her mind before executing her decision 
without worrying that this change of mind will yield any negative consequences. But if a 
patient asks her doctor to withdraw treatment or administer palliative but death-hastening 
treatment, she may feel reluctant to change her mind for fear of disappointing or 
bothering the doctor and losing eligibility for the same treatment the next time she 
requests it. 1 1 2  
B. The Undue Pressure Argument 
While the policy arguments for physician-assisted suicide in Part IV.A are strong, 
I 1 2. Brody uses this same psychological point to argue that if physician-assisted suicide is allowed, the 
lethal substance should be administered by the patient herself rather than by the doctor. See Brody, supra n. 
97, at 1 386. But see Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 1 02, at 249-50 ("Because of either patient condition or incorrect 
dosing, many patients will be unable to swallow or keep the pills down. This raises the probability that 
assistance beyond prescribing lethal medications will be essential and may even suggest that active euthanasia, 
or lethal injection, would be more effective and likely would seem more humane. Furthermore, the question of 
how to deal with a failed attempt remains, particularly if that act has rendered the patient worse off or unable to 
request or complete another attempt."); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Compassion Is Not Enough, in Foley & Hen din, 
supra n. 7, at 46 ([l]n fact, self-administered prescriptions may fail  in a significant number of cases. As a 
result, the act of dying may be prolonged and unpleasant. The dose of the lethal medication may well have to 
be repeated or replaced by direct euthanasia. If this is so, it would require the physician to administer the dose, 
or to be present and ready to accelerate death more directly if the first effort fails. Assisted suicide quickly 
becomes direct and active euthanasia with the transfer of power from the patient to the physician - the 
antithesis of the expression of autonomy so many seek."). 
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they are not strong enough. They are counteracted by even stronger policy arguments 
against physician-assisted suicide. Importantly, the latter arguments apply with greater 
force to physician-assisted suicide than to withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment or 
palliative but death-hastening treatment, a point that will be defended in Part IV.F 
The Undue Pressure Argument predicts that legalizing physician-assisted suicide 
will put serious financial pressure on terminally ill patients, especially terminally ill 
patients who are poor, to choose this option rather than the option of lifesaving medical 
treatment. Because physician-assisted suicide will be significantly cheaper than life­
sustaining treatments, it is highly likely that Medicare and Medicaid officials, health and 
life insurance companies, viatica! settlement companies, and managed care plans-all of 
which are concerned at least to minimize their costs and possibly to maximize their 
profits-will much more frequently recommend against lifesaving medical treatment 
than they would have if the much cheaper option of physician-assisted suicide were not 
available as a legal alternative. 1 1 3  
Needless to say, this situation would be highly undesirable. We do not want 
patients choosing-no less being forced to choose-physician-assisted suicide simply for 
financial considerations. For, first, financial considerations are simply the wrong kind of 
basis for decisions that have such significant non-financial-i.e., personal, inter­
personal, and spiritual/religious-significance and ramifications. Second, the financial 
pressure may be so overwhelming that it would render many less affluent patients' 
decisions to elect physician-assisted suicide non-voluntary and non-consensua!. 1 1 4 
This financial pressure will only be compounded by psychological pressure as 
well. Too many terminally ill patients wish to die because they feel--or, worse, have 
been made to feel-like annoying nuisances to their families and doctors. 1 1 5  Legalizing 
physician-assisted suicide would simply intensify this guilt and therefore the "subtle 
coercion" on these patients to take this now legally available route. When physician­
assisted suicide is illegal, patients do not have to justify their failure to exercise this 
option. It is simply not an option in the first place. If anything, they would have to 
justify why they still wish to die in spite of this legal roadblock. But if physician­
assisted suicide were legalized, then the burden would suddenly fall on patients to justify 
why they are continuing to live-and thereby inconveniencing everybody around them 
for the indefinite future-rather than choosing this now legally available alternative. 
And they will feel themselves unable to satisfy this burden precisely because they will 
have internalized the attitude of rejection that they perceive all around them. They will 
deem themselves unworthy of continued existence precisely because everybody else 
around them deems them unworthy of continued existence. 1 1 6 
1 1 3.  See Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 1 02, at 238-39; Stephanie Graboyes-Russo, Too Costly to Live: The Moral 
Hazards of a Decision in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacca v. Quill, 5 1  U. Miami L. Rev. 907, 91 9-924 
(1 997); Jamison, supra n. 85, at 37. 
1 1 4. See Graboyes-Russo, supra n. 1 26, at 925-27. 
1 1 5. See Cohn & Lynn, supra n. I 02, at 257-59; Graboyes-Russo, supra n. 126, at 925-28; Jamison, supra 
n. 85, at  37; Kass, supra n. 36, at 22-30; Pellegrino, supra n. 85, at 48. 
1 1 6. See Kass, supra n. 36, at 24; Martha Minow, Which Question? Which Lie? Reflections on the 
Physician-A ssisted Suicide Cases, 1 997 S. Ct. Rev. I ,  2 1  (One of two "lies" the Court told in Vacca and 
Glucksberg was that permitting physician-assisted suicide "would not systematically and routinely be used to 
push dying people into death. . . . [T]he problem arises from the inauguration of a regime in which people 
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The patients who would feel themselves unable to satisfy this burden (of justifying 
their continuing to live) would then be dying too early-too early relative to when they 
would have died had their preferences been optimized.117 As a society, we simply don't 
want people choosing to die prematurely for the wrong reasons. And one very wrong 
reason would include a sense of worthlessness, a sense that one is not worth the 
inconvenience and financial hardships that one's continuing to live might impose on 
others.118 
Of course, an advocate of physician-assisted suicide might respond that even if the 
Too Early Argument applies to some patients, it does not apply to Lisa. Therefore if 
physician-assisted suicide were legalized, it should be restricted to patients in Lisa's 
situation-again, terminally ill with no chance of recovery, less than six months to live, 
and suffering excruciating pain. 
Even then, however, Lisa may be dying too early. If she is suffering excruciating 
pain, death is not the only possible means of escape. She still has the option of palliative 
care. And if she, for some reason, does not have this option, then she should be given it. 
For this approach would enable Lisa to overcome her pain and thereby to enjoy another 
day, another week, another month, or even another six months of life. Physician-assisted 
suicide wipes out this possibility entirely. It simply destroys the possibility of recovery 
and, with it, the prospect of continuing a life of value. 
There are very few situations in which palliative care, when made available, is 
insufficient to alleviate a patient's pain and suffering.119 Unfortunately, it is not always 
would have to justify continuing to live. Rooting the permission in a right or protected interest . . .  would not 
save individuals from pressures to die imposed directly or indirectly by family members, physicians, managed 
care providers, or the patients' own sense of guilt and burden." (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original)). 
These arguments are especially applicable to terminally ill patients who are disabled. See Diane Coleman, Not 
Dead Yet, in Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7; Evan J. Kemp, Jr., Could You Please Die Now? Disabled People Like 
Me Have Good Reason to Fear the Push for Assisted Suicide, Wash. Post C l  (Jan. 5, 1997); Julie G. Madorsky, 
Is the S/ippe1y Slope Steeper for People with Disabilities? 166 W. J. Med. 410 (1997); Anita Si lvers, 
Protecting the Innocents: People with Disabilities and Physician-Assisted Dying, 1 66 W. J. Med. 407 (1997). 
117. See Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102 , at 241. 
118. For different versions of the Too Early Argument, see Harvey M. Chochinov and Leonard Schwartz, 
Depression and the Will to Live in the Psychological Landscape of Terminally Ill Patients, in Foley & Hendin, 
supra n. 7; Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102, at 243, 247, 257-59; Coleman, supra n. 129, at 224; Council on Ethical 
& Jud. Affairs, supra n. I ,  at 2231; Kass, supra n. 36, at 36; Cicely Saunders, A Hospice Perspective, in Foley 
& Hendin, supra n. 7, at 289. 
119. See Callahan, supra n. 96, at 65; Cohn & Lynn, supra n. I 02, at 258; Kass, supra n. 36, at 23. Still, it 
must be acknowledged that in at least some situations, even the most advanced palliative care fails to reduce 
patients' suffering to a tolerable level. See Justice Breyer's concurrence in G/ucksberg, 521 U.S. at 791-92; 
Brief ofthe Coalition of Hospice Professionals in Vacca and Glucksberg, 1996 WL 709342 at **6-7 (Dec. 10, 
1996); Brody, supra n. 97, at 1385; Michael H. Levy, Medical Management of Cancer Pain, in Principles and 
Practice of Pain Management 235 (Carol A. Warfield ed., McGraw Hill 1993); New York State Task Force on 
Life and Law, supra n. 42, at 40; Rawls et al., supra n. 8, at 44; Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case 
of Individualized Decision Making, 32  N. Eng. J. Med. 691, 694 (Mar. 1991); Timothy E. Quill, Christine K. 
Cassel, & Diane E. Meier, Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted 
Suicide, 327 N. Eng. J. Med. 1 380, 1 383 (Nov. 1 992); Student Author, supra n. 36, at 247 n. 98; Vacca, 
Res pt.'s Br., supra n. 60, at 8-9. 
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made available. 1 20 But this is not an argument for physician-assisted suicide. This is an 
argument for improving the current situation and extending adequate palliative care to 
every patient who needs it. 1 2 1  
Too many patients like Lisa wish to die because they suffer less from physical pain 
and more from "psychic" pain-i.e., because they are depressed, hopeless, or terrified. 
Once again, death is not the only means of escape from these feelings. Not only 
palliative care but also adequate psychiatric care, in conjunction with love and support 
from family and friends, provides a more desirable means. This is a more desirable 
means because, unlike an early death, it serves intrinsically desirable ends. Psychiatric 
care can help patients like Lisa to enjoy life again, recognize how valued and valuable 
they are, conquer their despair, fulfill more goals, indulge in pleasant memories, come to 
terms with their past failures, make amends for previous misdeeds, reconcile with people 
they may have neglected or cut off, share more quality time with their family and friends, 
and generally find greater meaning in their lives and experiences. 122 Unfortunately, like 
palliative care, adequate psychiatric care is not always made available either. But once 
again, this is not an argument for physician-assisted suicide. It is an argument for 
extending adequate psychiatric care to every patient who needs it. 
D. The Trust Argument 
The Trust Argument proceeds in two parts. 123 The first part suggests that a patient 
is entitled to believe that her physician has her best interests in mind. Without this 
entitlement, she will be less likely to confide in her physician. And the less likely she is 
to confide in her physician, the less likely she will be to give her physician all of the 
information that the physician needs in order to give her optimal treatment. All else 
being equal, then, there is a direct correlation between the level of a patient's trust in her 
physician and the level of medical care that she receives. Whatever works to diminish 
the former will also work to diminish the latter. 
The second part of the Trust Argument suggests that if physician-assisted suicide 
were legalized, then diminished trust and inferior medical care would likely result. If 
physician-assisted suicide were legalized, then a patient who is, or even just appears to 
be, terminally ill might very well worry that her physician secretly intends to kill her 
either because the physician thinks that killing the patient is in the patient' s  best interest 
or because the physician regards the patient's  continued existence as an unnecessary 
burden on the doctor herself, on the patient's family, or on society. As a result, the 
patient may not tell her physician everything she needs to know. Indeed, she may even 
1 20. See Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102, at 241, 243-44; Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7, at 2, 3-4, 14. 
1 2 1 .  See Chochinov and Schwartz, supra n. 1 3 1 ,  at 269-70; Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102, at 243-44, 260; 
Kathleen Foley, Compassionate Care, Not Assisted Suicide, in Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7; Graboyes-Russo, 
supra n. 1 26, at 934; Kass, supra n. 36, at 36; Pellegrino, supra n. 85, at 50; Saunders, supra n. 1 3 1 ,  at 285-86, 
289. 
1 22. See Chochinov & Schwartz, supra n. 1 3 1 ,  at 270-77; Kass, supra n .  36, at 38-39; Pellegrino, supra n. 
85, at 50; Saunders, supra n. 1 3 1 ,  at 287-88, 290-9 1 .  
1 23. For similar versions of the Trust Argument, see Cohen-Aimagor, supra n. 94, at 200; Council on 
Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. 1, at 2232; Jamison, supra n. 85, at 34-35; Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92, at 
1 1 6; Gaylin et al., supra n. 85; New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, supra n. 42, at 1 05-06; Kass, 
supra n. 36, at 27-29; Orentlicher, supra n. 30, at 664. 
2007] GONZALES V. OREGON AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 
refrain from seeing a physician altogether. 
E. The Slippery Slope Argument 
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Finally, the Slippery Slope Argument makes an even more ominous predict ion 
than do the Undue Pressure Argument and the Trust Argument. The Slippory Slope 
Argument predicts that if physician-assisted suicide is legalized, then both the mesanae 
of this legal measure itself as well as the fact that some or many physicians will end up 
killing their patients will ultimately change society's view of physicians and oncmte 
deva&tating psychological and sociological problems. 124 Once physician-assisted suicide 
has the stamp of lawfulness, both the physicians who implement it as wel l  us their 
colleagues will increasingly tend to regard killing as "not so bad," a "necessary ovil.'f 
And as the practice becomes more and more commonplace, some of them might even 
come to regard such killings as useful. Some more opportunistic (and malevolent) 
physicians might come to regard physician-assisted suicide as an all-too-convenient 
means of "weeding out" the "weakest" or "least desirable" members of society. Inspired 
by their ideas of what society should look like and their notions about who belongs and 
who does not, they may actually use their positions of authority to pressure vulnerable 
patients who were otherwise opposed to dying to change their minds. Even worse, they 
may attempt to manipulate patients who were not even terminally ill in the first place to 
consider the option.1 25 
This is called the Slippery Slope Argument because it predicts that the legalization 
of physician-assisted suicide will generate a slippery slope toward a much greater 
number of premature deaths. 126 Indeed, as proponents of the Slippery Slope Argument 
contend, precisely this situation occurred in Nazi Germany. 127 What started out as a 
"small" euthanasia program designed to kill "only" the most feeble-minded members of 
society eventually grew into the Final Solution. It has been well-documented that 
underlying this dramatic expansion in social engineering was an equally dramatic 
transformation in physicians' attitudes toward life, death, and killing.1 28 The more 
commonplace and socially accepted killing by physicians became, the more inured they 
became to the act of killing itself. And the more inured they became to the act of killing, 
the more inclined they were to broaden their conceptions of "weak," "undesirable," and 
"unworthy of life" to include members of society other than the mentally incompetent. 
This "brutalization" or "desensitization" to the value of human life eventually 
spread in part from physicians to society in general. Because physicians tended 
124. See Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92, at 1 15-16; New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, supra 
n. 42, at 1 07, 109, 1 1 2-13. 
125. See Cohen-Almagor, supra n. 94, at 188-89; Davies, supra n. 93, at 90; Jamison, supra n. 85, at 43; 
Kass, supra n. 36, at 23-28; Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92, at 1 21-24; The Euthanasia Report 4 (1 988). 
126. See Callahan, supra n. 96, at 61 ; Cohen-Aimagor, supra n. 94, at 188-89; Jamison, supra n. 85, at 36-
39; Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92, at 1 08-09, 124-26; George J .  Annas, The Promised End-Constitutional 
Aspects of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 335 New Eng. J. Med. 683 ( 1 996); Herbert Hendin, Chris Rutenfrans & 
Zbigniew Zylicz, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Lessons from the Dutch, 277 
J. Am. Med. Assn. 1 720 (1 997); Madorsky, supra n. 1 29; Orentlicher, supra n. 30, at 664. 
1 27. See e.g. Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92, at 1 24-26; Sprung, supra n. 85, at 221 4-15. 
1 28. See generally Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide 
(Basic Books 1 986). 
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increasingly to regard certain human beings as "life unworthy of life," and because 
physicians commanded such high respect, their attitudes and actions inevitably helped to 
soften the rest of society's opposition to killing. Of course, physicians in Nazi Germany 
were aided by other societal forces such as propaganda, ethnic prejudice, and tenor. But 
the point remains that physicians played an instrumental role in helping to bring about 
the changes in attitude that would eventually make the Holocaust possible.129 
F. Why These Arguments Apply with Greater Force to Physician-Assisted Suicide than 
to Withdrawal of Lifesaving Medical Treatment 
The main reason that physician-assisted suicide constitutes more of a threat than 
withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment is because, all else being equal, it is 
psychologically less difficult-easier-for a doctor to carry out. Physician-assisted 
suicide is easier because it helps to increase the "distance" between the doctor's actions 
and the patient's death. While withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment requires the 
doctor to perform acts that lead directly to the patient's demise, physician-assisted 
suicide permits the doctor merely to write a prescription and let the patient "do the 
rest" -i.e., administer the lethal substance to herself. As a result, legalization of 
physician-assisted suicide is likely to lead to the result that some, and therefore too 
many, patients are permitted to die not for the right reason-i.e., because they fall into 
the very small category of terminally ill patients for whom adequate palliative care is 
medically unavailable-but rather for the wrong reason that their doctors simply have 
less psychological resistance to this option. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the United States Supreme Court declined in Vacco and Glucksberg to 
extend constitutional protection to physician-assisted suicide, it recently held in Gonzales 
that States may still legalize physician-assisted suicide. So as things stand now, whether 
or not a given patient has the legal right to elect physician-assisted suicide depends on 
what her state legislature has said on the matter. So far, only Oregon has legalized this 
practice. The other forty-nine States have not. If the position taken by this article is 
con-ect, the other forty-nine States should not follow Oregon's example primarily for 
policy reasons. 
Still, this is hardly a categorical stance. Unlike strictly ethical reasons, policy 
reasons can be undermined by empirical data. So where we go from here largely 
depends on what has happened, and is happening, in Oregon, the United States' very 
own physician-assisted-suicide "laboratory." 130 If an objective assessment of the data-
129. See Cohen-Almagor, supra n. 94, at 190. Brian Kalt discusses the implications of physician-assisted 
suicide for the "ethical integrity of the medical profession," which he abbreviates as "EIMP." See generally 
Brian C. Kalt, Death, Ethics, and the State, 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 487 (2000). 
130. Much work has already been done in this area. For essays that offer a negative assessment of the 
Oregon experience, see Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin, The Oregon Experiment, in Foley & Hendin, 
supra n. 7; N. Gregory Hamilton, Oregon 's Culture of Silence, in Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7; David W. 
Kissane, Deadly Days in Darwin, in Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7. For a more sanguine assessment primarily of 
physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands, secondarily of physician-assisted suicide in Oregon, see Amanda 
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including physician surveys, psychiatric reports, and family and patient interviews­
indicates that too many patients have exercised physician-assisted suicide for the wrong 
reasons (e.g., treatable pain or depression or worries about being a nuisance or economic 
burden to one's  family), then this practice should not only not be adopted elsewhere but 
should be abandoned in Oregon as well. Otherwise, if an objective assessment of the 
data indicates that the "Oregon experiment" has succeeded and physician-assisted 
suicide has been chosen only by the small minority of patients for whom palliative and 
psychiatric care was provided but still failed sufficiently to alleviate their suffering, then 
it should arguably remain legal in Oregon and be adopted by other States, as long as the 
same restrictions and safeguards are carefully codified and strictly enforced. 
Gardner, Dutch Euthanasia Rates Steady After Legalization, available at http://www.medicinenet.com/script/ 
main/art.asp?articlekey=8 1 027. 
